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1. Introduction: Fichtean Spirit and Letter
1 The  example  is  well-known.  Monsieur  Jourdain –  the  main  character  in  Molière’s
comedy Le Bourgeois gentilhomme – has an epiphany: under the tutelage of a master of
philosophy he suddenly becomes aware of the nature of his own language: 
Monsieur Jourdain: Par ma foi, il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose, sans
que j’en susse rien; et je vous suis le plus obligé du monde, de m’avoir appris cela. 
(By my faith! I have been speaking prose for forty years without being aware of it at
all; I am infinitely obliged to you for having taught me that.)1
2 Although  presented  as  comedy,  this  example  nevertheless  highlights  an  important
philosophical point: the difference between merely carrying out acts (here speaking
words) and having a conscious understanding of their laws and classification. Johann
Gottlieb Fichte philosophically refers to the example of Monsieur Jourdain a number of
times in his works, including in the Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre.2 With his
writings on the difference between the letter and spirit in philosophy (Ueber Geist und
Buchstab in der Philosophie3), and his long and complex early 1795 essay on language: Von
der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache4, it would be hard to accuse Fichte of
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being  a  philosopher  who  was  unconscious  or  indifferent  to  the  nature  of  his  own
written and spoken language. 
3 Indeed, Fichte’s struggle for an appropriate philosophical language is often discussed in
his main published writings on the Wissenschaftslehre. In section §1 of Über den Begriff
der Wissenschaftslehre Fichte claimed that there was a necessary and universal system of
philosophical terminology that must be employed in accordance with transcendental
concepts, but that it could only be fully and accurately determined after the system had
been completed.5 While in the Preface to the first and principal presentation of his
system – the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/95 – Fichte wrote that
he had eschewed a fixed or set terminology both in order to stimulate independent
cognitive work in his students and to prevent the ossifying of his system. Moreover, he
would continue to adhere to this maxim of changing his technical language in all future
presentations  of  his  philosophy.6 As  Daniel  Breazeale  puts  it  in  his  article  in  the
Cambridge Companion to Fichte: 
“It was, in fact, Fichte’s deliberate and lifelong policy to adopt a new philosophical
vocabulary for virtually every new presentation of his system. His stated reason for
doing this was, first of all, to avoid giving comfort to those who might have thought
that they could ‘master the Wissenschaftslehre’ merely by memorizing a glossary of
technical terms.”7 
4 For Fichte,  active  philosophical  thought  and spirit  had priority  over  the letter  and
language,  with  the  latter  classified  as  the  outer  “designation”  (Bezeichnung)  or
“expression” (Ausdruck) of the inner cognitive activity: “Language, in the broadest sense
of the word, is the expression of our thought by means of arbitrary signs.”8 This is why when
trying to understand the Wissenschaftslehre it is imperative to move beyond the mere
letter of the text. 
5 However,  because  Fichte  wrote  numerous  (originally  unpublished)  versions  of  his
system,  certain  commentators  and  readers  have  assumed  that  the  letter  was  not
important to him. On the contrary, it was of the utmost importance, since the chief
reasons behind this multiplicity were to attain ever greater clarity of expression and to
present one and the same philosophy from fresh standpoints.9 In this regard, Fichte
wrote in the preface to the second edition of the Grundlage that he was thinking of
publishing a  new written version of  the Wissenschaftslehre;  but  if  this  occurred,  the
reader would not find any radical departure from the earlier text, but merely “the same
content in two very different forms and recognise it to be same again.”10 Nor should
one draw the conclusion from the multiple versions of the Wissenschaftslehre that the
main published text of the Grundlage itself was not clear, accurate or understandable
enough, or even that it was now obsolete. In Fichte’s eyes, the text was still valid and
crystal clear: “What has been thought in a perfectly clear manner, is understandable;
and I am conscious of having conceived everything in a perfectly clear way.”11 
6 Finding  the  best  philosophical  expressions  were  therefore  paramount  to  Fichte,
because if upon reading his work one already misunderstands the written letter, it will
almost be impossible to move onto its inner spirit. In the fascinating but frequently
overlooked small published text from 1800, Aus einem Privatschreiben, Fichte elaborated
on some of the misunderstandings connected with his choice of philosophical language.
He stated that he instinctively chose terms that could convey the living and active
intentions of his philosophizing. For example, German words ending with the suffix “-
ung”,  such  as  Ordnung or  Wirkung,  were  never  to  be  understood  statically  in  his
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writings, but dynamically, because in his mind they always refer to activity – to the act of
ordering  or  to  the  act of  effecting  respectively:  “I  am  so  wedded  to  this  way  of
expressing myself that when I begin to philosophize in the manner that is natural to
me no other meaning comes into my thoughts at all”.12 
7 What about modern-day readers and scholars of philosophy – to what extent are we
similar to Monsieur Jourdain with regard to Fichte’s philosophical language? Or do we
now have a better grasp of the flexible and dynamic qualities of his vocabulary, how
and why Fichte selected certain terms, not to mention the underlying concepts, ideas
and acts that his words are meant to express? In the last twenty years, great strides
have been made in the scholarship concerning Fichte’s philosophical terminology and
thoughts on language.13 Although the newly published Cambridge Companion to Fichte,
edited by David James and Gunter Zöller, does not have an individual text specifically
devoted to Fichte’s  conception of  language and philosophical  terms,  it  nevertheless
contains a number of valuable insights directly related to these issues. Emiliano Acosta
recently reviewed the Cambridge Companion to Fichte for the Revista de Estud(i)os sobre
Fichte, giving a general overview of it.14 In the present review-essay I will critically focus
on a few specific topics in the volume, particularly the relationship between Fichte’s
language, thought, and philosophical method. 
 
2. What is “Setzen” (Positing)? 
8 Fichte’s term “setzen” (posit) is surely one of the most ubiquitous and cited but least
understood  notions  in  the  whole  of  his  philosophy.  Paul  Frank’s  article  “Fichte’s
Position” in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte is such an outstanding contribution to the
literature on the topic of positing because it explains Fichte’s nuanced employment of
this term as well as making a convincing case that its origins should be sought for in
the  Kantian  and  logical  philosophical  traditions.15 Before  turning  to  Paul  Franks’s
interpretation, I will first of all immanently examine Fichte’s understanding of setzen in
his writings. 
9 What exactly does setzen mean for Fichte? In §1 of his central text the Grundlage der
gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/95, Fichte sets out the aim of his philosophy: to
discover the first principle of all human knowledge, one that does not enter into the
empirical  determinations  of  consciousness,  yet  still  lies  at  the  basis  of  it.16 His
argumentation begins by drawing a direct parallel between the certainty of positing in
logical  thought and the principle of  identity before moving onto an analysis  of  the
nature of the judgments carried out by the I (Ich).17 Here “setzen” or positing signifies a
particular type of philosophical judging and asserting. More exactly, in the opening
sections  of  the  Grundlage it  concerns  a  rather  unique  act  of  theoretical  reflection
(Reflexion) and abstraction (Abstraktion). For readers are asked to begin with any fact of
empirical  consciousness,  then  to  reflect  on  their  own  inner  thought  activity,
continually stripping away anything empirical,  leading them to a more transparent
consciousness of the structure of human cognition.18 Eventually, the reader learns to
determine  and  posit  things  schlechthin –  that  is  to  say,  absolutely,  or  without  any
further grounds: “one attributes to oneself the capacity to posit something absolutely.”19
This will include the activity of one’s own I, or an awareness of what Fichte calls “the
absolute I”. However, the absolute I is not a thing or object, but pure activity: “The
absolute I  of  the first  principle  is  not  something;  (it  does not  have a predicate,  and
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cannot have any), it is absolutely, what it is, and it cannot be explained any further.”20
Accordingly, “setzen” in the early sections of the Grundlage seems above all to relate to
the self-aware, active and absolute form of thinking (denken) and knowing carried out by
the philosophizing I. 
10 However,  if  we are to take seriously Fichte’s  own specific  statements on his  use of
philosophical  language,  then  any  particular  sentence  or  proposition  of  the
Wissenschaftslehre can only be fully grasped to the extent that the reader has examined
it in its proper context and obtained an understanding of the Wissenschaftslehre as a
totality:  “One  explains  by  means  of  the  context,  and  one  should  first  acquire  an
overview of the whole before trying to rigorously determine an individual sentence.”21
A hallmark of Fichte’s approach in the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre is that
he repeatedly stresses the crucial interdependency between the part and the whole: “I
request the future judge of this text to proceed to the whole, and to view every single
thought from the vantage point of the whole.”22 
11 In other words, even though Fichte’s use of setzen is especially crucial in Part One of the
Grundlage, we should not neglect to examine the other parts of the text to see what else
he might have to say about this concept and term. There we see that in Part Two Fichte
does not simply consider setzen in connection with thinking and logical deductions, but
also directly relates it to anschauen (intuiting). For example: “The I (Ich) posits itself as
intuiting, signifies to begin with: it posits itself in the intuition as active.”23 In Fichte’s
epistemology  the  conscious  volition  activity  of  the  I  may  be  immediately  grasped;
however,  this  cannot  be  done  by  means  of  discursive  thought  or  concepts,  but  it
requires the faculty of intuition. In this respect it should not be forgotten that in the
preface  to the  Grundlage Fichte  maintains  that  his  entire  system  of  philosophy
ultimately  rests  on  a  free  Tathandlung or  act of  the  I  –  and  this  free  act  must  be
comprehended by means of the “faculty of inner intuition.”24 In a later published text
Fichte would write that the grounding of his theory of knowledge on the primacy of
intuition  (Anschauung)  instead  of  on  concepts  is  a  sign  of  his  attempt  to  progress
beyond Kant’s epistemology.25 
12 Accordingly, I would argue that in the Grundlage the term “setzen” is deployed in at least
two distinct yet interrelated senses: it essentially signifies both thinking and intuiting. In
the  first  sense  it  relates  to  our  theoretical  activity,  in  the  second to  our  practical
activity. That the term setzen is capable of being deployed in a twofold sense in the
Grundlage is specifically highlighted by Fichte himself in the text: “In the two sentences
that have just been stated there is obviously a double sense (Doppelsinn) in the meaning
of the word ‘positing’ (setzen).”26 Here Fichte’s underscoring of the “double sense” of
setzen occurs in the context of a discussion about the passive and active nature of the I,
about its real and ideal grounds. In essence, for Fichte, one becomes aware of the ideal
ground  through  the  activity  of  thinking,  whereas  intuiting  is  required  for  a
consciousness of  the real  or  practical  ground.  Moreover,  the fact  that  setzen in  the
Grundlage had been be employed in a twofold sense in terms of thinking and intuiting,
including in relation to the object-nature of the empirical I, is confirmed by Fichte in
his  1798  System  of  Ethics.  There  he  writes:  “However  –  a  proposition  that  we  can
presuppose to be known and proved from a Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre –
the I is something only to the extent and degree in which it posits (intuits and thinks)
itself as the same, and it is nothing that it does not posit itself to be.”27
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13 The twofold philosophical sense of “positing” in the Grundlage is not unknown in the
research. In 1996 Claudio Cesa published a seminal essay precisely on Fichte’s reference
to this double meaning of setzen.28 In his article in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte,
Paul Franks does not refer to Cesa’s seminal text, but it is cited by Christian Klotz in
another  contribution.29 Cesa  also  points  to  a  corresponding  example  of  the  double
function of the activity of positing in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo.30 There
the context is on the synthesis of the real and ideal activity of the I, and how it might
be possible to unite them in consciousness in an unconditioned or absolute (schlechthin)
manner:  “The  proposition,  ‘the  I  posits  itself’,  thus  has  two  inseparably  linked
meanings: an ideal and real meaning, both of which are absolutely united in the I.”31 
14 In his illuminating discussion on setzen or positing in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte,
Paul Franks goes greatly beyond much of the earlier research. Although he does not
cite Fichte’s later reference in the Grundlage to the word’s “double sense”, he arrives at
exactly the same conclusion that it should be understood in this manner. Therefore, I
can only agree with him when he puts forward the view that Fichte chose this unusual
term  positing  because  he  needed  a  single  linguistic  formulation  for  capturing  this
unified  notion  of  the  human  being.  Franks  argues  that,  philosophically  speaking,
positing  is  a  term  which  particularly  well  expresses  the  theoretical  and  practical
rational activities of the I itself: Fichte “needs a fundamental notion of rational agency
as such. Positing is the notion he employs. […] Furthermore, since Fichte rejects any
radical distinction between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, positing is
an activity that is capable of both theoretical and practical inflections.”32 
15 Paul  Franks  also  rightly  points  to  the  logical  tradition  of  ponere in  which  setzen
originally arose, and shows Kant’s recourse to it in his early text of 1763: Only Possible
Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God. There Kant equates positing
with being: “The concept of position or positing is perfectly simple: it is identical with
the concept of being in general.”33 Thus, on the topic of philosophical origins too, Paul
Franks’s article provides a much more detailed and original treatment of the Kantian
heritage of positing in Fichte than all previous commentators, convincingly showing
among other things how it relates to Kant’s reflections on the question of existence,
position in space, and the issues relating to the ontological proof of God.34 However,
perhaps  there  are  other  fundamental  Fichtean  links  to  Kant’s  text,  especially  in
connection with Fichte’s  philosophy of  religion.  For  if  Fichte’s  concept  of  setzen or
positing is  indebted to  Kant’s  treatment of  being and absolute  positing in  the Only
Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, as it definitely seems
to be, then a possible avenue of future research that could be worth exploring is how
far  Fichte’s  references  to  absolute  positing  and the  modes  of  Spinoza’s  God in  the
Grundlage35,  are also a transformation or extension of Kant’s  arguments on absolute
positing and Spinoza’s God in that same early 1763 text.36 
 
3. The Significance of Fichte’s Tathandlung 
16 It should be clear that with the example of setzen or ‘positing’, readers of Fichte should
bear  in  mind  the  possibility  that  his  key  philosophical  terms  might  have  multiple
meanings. And of course, even though the terms change in the different versions of the
Wissenschaftslehre, the central underlying ideas and philosophical doctrines do not change,
but  are  carried  over into  subsequent  presentations.  This  important  principle  is
The “Double Sense” of Fichte’s Philosophical Language. Some Critical Reflecti...
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 15 | 2017
5
summarized by Daniel Breazeale in The Cambridge Companion to Fichte, when discussing
the Fichtean conception of Anstoß in the early Grundlage and later nova methodo:  “A
similar point might also be made about the differences in technical terminology found
in the two presentations. Thus, for example, though the term Anstoß or ‘check’ does not
occur  in  the  second  presentation,  the  doctrine  itself  is  retained,  though what  was
previously referred to as a ‘check’ upon the activity of the I is now called ‘a feeling of
the I’s original limitation or determinacy’ […] The same is true for other key terms: the
‘subject/object’ of the second presentation, for example, is simply another name for the
‘f/act’ or Tathandlung of the first presentation.”37 
17 This leads to the question: apart from setzen (positing), what about other key Fichtean
terms – do they too have an especially dual meaning or significance? As one can see
from Daniel Breazeale’s statement above, the free Tathandlung or act carried out by the
transcendental  philosopher  relates  to  the  I  as  both  a  subject  and object,  or  more
exactly, as a “subject-object”. Like with setzen, the word Tathandlung also seems to have
dual sense, and which is directly evident in the composition of the term itself.  It is
made  up  of  the  two  German  words  Tat (deed)  and  Handlung (action).  In  the
Wissenschaftslehre, Tathandlung relates to the ability of the I as subject to carry out an
action in which it becomes its own cognitive object. Fichte repeatedly juxtaposes this
inner act with Tatsachen – the facts or objects of external being. Again, it  is not by
chance that Fichte intentionally chose the term Tatsache to highlight this juxtaposition,
for it is also a composite word formed out of two other words, Tat (deed) and Sachen
(things). 
18 In the Cambridge Companion to Fichte Elizabeth Millán succinctly observes the willed and
performative  aspect  of  this  move:  Fichte’s  philosophy  is  a  “bold  shift  from  a  fact
(Tatsache)  of  consciousness to an act  of  performance (Tathandlung)  of  consciousness
uncovering a new starting point for all philosophizing.”38 While in his rich article on
“The Dynamic Structure of Consciousness”, Christian Klotz also underscores the dual
sense of Tathandlung: “There are two important aspects that Fichte wants to emphasize
with  this  peculiar  terminological  move.  First,  the  term  expresses  the  difference
between  the  self-constitutive  activity  of  the  I  and  whatever  is  a  fact  (Tatsache)  of
consciousness and thus is grounded by the I’s activity. Secondly, the term ‘Tathandlung’
also expresses the intrinsic character of this activity: the action in the sense of acting
(Handlung)  immediately  brings  about  its  result  (Tat)  …”39 However,  the  word
Tathandlung is  not  a  neologism  created  by  Fichte,  as  Christian  Klotz  mistakenly
remarks.40 That  is  still  a  widespread  misconception  in  the  research.  Paul  Franks
demonstrated twenty years  ago that  its  origin lies  in  the two spheres  of  right  and
religion. During Fichte’s epoch, the term Tatsache was the one that was actually the new
compound neologism. It had been created by Spalding out of Tat and Sache and used by
him to translate the English word “matters of fact”.41 
19 Fully in line with the maxim of repeatedly modifying his terminology, the unique act
that Fichte had first called “Tathandlung” in 1794, becomes designated in 1804 by the
Greek word “Genesis”, since the earlier German word had been more difficult to grasp:
“The Wissenschaftslehre is underpinned by and testifies to an Act (Tathandlung), which I
have named in these lectures using the Greek word Genesis, since the Greek terms are
often more easily and correctly understood than the German ones.”42
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4. Antitheses: Other Key Fichtean Terms with a
“Double Sense”
20 As we have seen, Fichte employs his philosophical language in various ways. Firstly, he
continually changes his philosophical terms to stimulate the spirit and avoid his system
becoming too static. Inversely, Fichte often uses one and the same philosophical term
like setzen that has a number of different but interrelated meanings. A term may even
have more than two meanings.  For example,  in his  study of  Fichte’s  1795 essay on
language Jere Surber shows that  willkührlich (arbitrary)  is  utilised in four distinctly
different senses.43 Likewise for Fichte’s  celebrated notion of  intellektuelle  Anschauung
(intellectual intuition). Daniel Breazeale has demonstrated in detail that throughout his
writings the single designation ‘intellectual intuition’ may signify for Fichte at least
four different things: i. an intellectual consciousness of freedom and the moral law; ii.
“pure I-hood” or identically, a Tathandlung; iii. a freely produced ‘fact of consciousness’;
and iv. the method of genetic construction.44 
21 So it is clearly imperative to examine the context in which any technical term appears
in  Fichte’s  writings  in  order  to  exactly  determine  the  sense  he  has  given  it.
Furthermore,  a  closer  analysis  of  Fichte’s  own  comments  on  his  method  of  his
philosophical  language  not  only  reveals  that  he  selected  and employed terms with
multiple and interrelated meanings, but that like with setzen, Fichte specifically uses
terms that express a “double sense”, in which the two main meanings appear at first
sight  to  be  directly  opposed or  antithetical  to  each other.  Here  I  will  briefly  list  a
number of other Fichtean terms that are employed in this manner and show that this
procedure is an intentional and intrinsic aspect of Fichte’s philosophical methodology. 
22 A classic  example of  this  apparently  antithetical  double sense in a  word is  Fichte’s
conception of Anstoß. In his article on the nova methodo in the Cambridge Companion to
Fichte,  Daniel  Breazeale  points  to  the  fact  that  Anstoß for  Fichte  may  signify  a
“summons”,  i.e.  an  impetus  impelling  the  I  to  a  fresh  and  new sphere  of  activity.
However, Anstoß is also used by Fichte in virtually the opposite sense, that is to say, as a
restriction for the I, blocking or hindering its activity.45 Elsewhere Breazeale has neatly
summarized the almost antithetical “double sense” of Anstoß in Fichte’s Grundlage der
gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. “[This passage in the Grundlage] encapsulates Fichte’s case
for the necessity of such an Anstoß for the very possibility of cognition at the same time
that it points to the dual role of the Anstoß as both a limit and a stimulus to the activity
of the I.”46 
23 Or to take another well-known example. – Fichte scholarship has again long noted that
Fichte  likewise  employs  “Bestimmung”  in  two  diametrical  senses.  In  the  Cambridge
Companion  to  Fichte,  Christian  Klotz  provides  an  important  outline  of  Fichte’s
conception of Wechselbestimmung (mutual determination): “It is through the opposed
directions involved in the mutual determinations of the I and not-I in the dynamical
sense  that  Fichte  can  introduce  –  albeit  in  an  initial  and  rudimentary  sense  –  the
distinction  between  the  ‘theoretical’  and  ‘practical’  aspects  of  consciousness.”47
However, it is worth remarking that this oppositional nature is even present in the
single term Bestimmung. On the one hand, Fichte’s concept of a Bestimmung is that of a
“determination”,  i.e.  determining,  measuring  or  defining  some  kind  of  object  or
activity (and here we see further explicit links to setzen and Anstoß); and on the other
hand, it is like a distant ideal, related to one’s human vocation. Günter Zöller perfectly
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summarizes  this  duality  present  in Fichte’s  1800 book Die  Bestimmung des  Menschen:
“The key word of the work’s German title ‘Bestimmung’, can mean both ‘determination’,
in the sense of an imposed limitation, and ‘calling’ or ‘vocation’, indicating the goal of
some pursuit. Fichte’s employment of the term in its finitist-finalist double meaning
addresses the tension between what is fixed or given in human existence and what is
open and yet to be realized about it.”48
24 A third example is Fichte’s enigmatic use of the old German word “Gesicht” in his Berlin
period,  a  term  which  literally  means  “face”.  In  his  article  “Fichte’s  Philosophy  of
Religion”  in  the  Cambridge  Companion  to  Fichte,  Hansjürgen  Verweyen  explains  how
Gesicht signifies for Fichte both a philosophical “idea” as well as a “spiritual revelation”.
49 Hence, this too appears to be a striking contradiction. No doubt most other thinkers
would thoroughly distinguish between the revelations or visions of a religious mystic
and the strictly deducted ideas of a philosopher. Yet in works such as the 1807/08 Reden
an die  deutsche Nation and the 1811/12 Vorlesungen über die  Bestimmung des  Gelehrten,
Fichte apparently sees no contradiction, clearly believing that the two senses of Gesicht
may ultimately be reconciled. In these two late Berlin texts he employs one and the
same word Gesicht for the visions of the Old Testament prophet Ezekiel  on the one
hand, and for the scientific ideas of the scholar of the Wissenschaftslehre on the other.50 
25 How could these two senses of Gesicht be rationally and epistemologically reconciled?
One possible path to examine would be to take Fichte’s  conception of Anschauen or
intellectual intuiting as a cognitive form of “seeing”, and then relate it  back to the
original Platonic Greek sense of “idea”, which as we saw is explicitly translated into
German  by  Fichte  as  Gesicht.  In  the  domain  of  his  philosophy  of  religion,  Fichte
designated Plato  as  one  of  the  philosophical  forerunners  to  the  Wissenschaftslehre.51
Günter  Zöller  remarks  in  his  article  “Fichte’s  Later  Presentations  of  the
Wissenschaftslehre” on Fichte’s Bildlehre, or theory of the image, are highly appropriate
in this regard: “Fichte’s imagist understanding of knowledge further strengthens the
linkage of his thought to Plato, whose key concept of Form (or Idea) is etymologically
derived from the Greek word for ‘seeing’. Like Plato, Fichte tends to cast his conception
of knowledge in visual terms by assimilating knowledge to seeing and by designating
the instantaneous obtaining of knowledge as ‘intuition’ and ‘insight’.”52 
 
5. Conclusion: Language in the Light of the Synthetic
Method
26 In the Preface to the Grundlage Fichte states: “I especially consider it necessary to recall
that I will not say everything, but I will also leave some things for my readers to think
about.”53 Looked at  in  isolation,  Fichte’s  employment of  the above-mentioned main
terms of setzen, Tathandlung, Bestimmung, Anstoß and Gesicht may appear unusual, and
perhaps not particularly methodical. It is only when we consider them as a totality that
a  pattern  and  systematicity  starts  to  arise.  Could  Fichte  have  intentionally  and
systematically used terms with almost antithetical senses – where it is left to the reader
to  carefully  examine the  context,  and to  actively  try  and overcome their  apparent
contradictions? It  appears so,  especially if  we view Fichte’s  linguistic  method as an
integral part of his general synthetic method of philosophy, and not divorced from it, as
is so often the case. 
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27 Fichte’s  synthetic  method  involves  the  positing  of  opposed  elements  and  then
undertaking a process which involves trying to overcome the antitheses. This process
involves the power of the imagination, which in Fichte’s system assists the I in uniting
the apparently contradictory elements. Fichte’s philosophical method is often known
by  the  triad  of  “thesis-antithesis-synthesis”,  as  Christian  Klotz  explains  in  his
contribution.54 Klotz is also one of the few contributors in the Cambridge Companion to
Fichte to highlight the crucial reconciling function that the power of the imagination
plays in the Wissenschaftslehre.55 Moreover, Daniel Breazeale’s article also provides an
overview of Fichte’s various methodical approaches in his Jena period. Breazeale notes
how Fichte’s method in the Grundlage specifically relates to what we have said above
concerning the activity of setzen and the other key Fichtean notions and terms. It is a
procedure of trying to reconcile the conflicts between the real and ideal activities of
the I: “The Foundation begins with a posited contradiction between the I and the not-I
and  then  proceeds  ‘inward’,  as  it  were,  first  redefining  the  conflict  between  the
‘directions’ of the I’s activities or between the ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ activities of the I, and
finally locating it within the necessary internal structure of I-hood itself.”56 
28 At the non-empirical and transcendental standpoint, the task of the philosopher is to
unite  these opposed elements  at  a  higher  level  by means of  a  synthesis.  To do this
properly, however, the philosopher must not neglect to freely engage their power of
imagination. For it is the latter power which allows the philosopher to hover between
the two extremes of the finite and the infinite, the ideal and the real, the theoretical
and  practical,  and  then  to  commence  the  process  of  overcoming  any  apparent
philosophical  contradiction.  –  And  not  only  that:  it  is  precisely  the  power  of  the
imagination that furthermore permits the student and reader of Fichte to pass from the
fixed outer letter to the dynamic inner philosophical spirit or ideas of his system. As
Fichte writes in the Grundlage: 
“The Wissenschaftslehre is of such a kind that it cannot at all be communicated by
the mere letter, but solely by the spirit. This is because in anyone who studies it, its
foundational ideas have to be generated by the creative power of the imagination
itself.”57 
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